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Lynne Rudder Baker, TheMetaphysics of Everyday Life.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. xv + 253 pp.
In TheMetaphysics of Everyday Life, Lynne Rudder Baker sets out her views on sev-
eral important topics in metaphysics, including personal identity, the ontology
of artifacts, time, vagueness, andcausation.Central toBaker’s discussionof these
topics is her elucidation anddefense of the existence and importance of the con-
stitution relation. According to Baker, persons are constituted by bodies but are
not identical to them. In fact, all “ordinary objects”—cars, planes, trees, and so
forth—are constituted by various mereological sums while not being reducible
to such sums. Baker argues that her view captures the natural way we think of
artifacts, persons, persistence through time, and causation. She devotes the final
part of the book to further defining, refining, and defending what she calls the
“metaphysical underpinnings” of her position.
Because the notion of constitution plays such a huge role in the book,
someone (likeme) who is not convinced by Baker’s reasons for supposing there
is such a relation (certainly as it applies to material objects) will get less out of
the book than someone who believes she makes her case. That said, Baker may
reasonably argue that the initial motivation for believing in constitution is less
important than the theoretical and explanatory benefits she goes on to adduce.
In what remains of this review, I will highlight why I findBaker’s appeal to consti-
tution insufficiently motivated and offer one objection to her view of persons.
In order to motivate her view of ordinary objects, Baker asks what we
should say, ontologically speaking, about what happened when the towers of the
World Trade Center were destroyed. She contrasts three views. Eliminativism
says that the towers do not exist (and never did). All that happens is that cer-
tain mereological atoms change their arrangement. Reductionism claims that
the towersaremereological sumsofparticles (and thatanyparticles you likecom-
pose a sum). We give the name “tower” to some such arrangements of particles.
Nonreductionism says that the towers are something over and abovemereologi-
cal sums. Baker believes that Nonreductionism is the only view of the three that
takes the irreducible reality of the towers seriously enough.Nonreductionism, as
she formulates it, leads very naturally to her constitution view.
My problem with this way of motivating her view is that it ignores or mis-
construes some very natural ways of understanding what happens to the towers.
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Consider the idea that theparticles compose the towers (and only the towers) and
that, after the attack occurs, the towers stop existing and the particles now com-
pose nothing at all. Alternatively, consider the idea that the particles compose
the towers (and only the towers) and that, after the attack occurs, the towers stop
existing and the particles from each tower now compose two scattered objects
(and only those objects) distinct from the towers. These views have no need of
Baker’s constitution relation, yet they take the ontological status of the towers
very seriously. The towers really do go out of existence after the attack. Baker does
not consider such natural ideas. She also dismisses too readily the reductionist
accounts she examines. Four-dimensionalist reductionists who believe that the
towers are just one of many temporal worms in existence can quite easily say
that the towers havemany important properties that other temporal worms lack.
Baker suggests that for such philosophers the destruction of the towers “should
be understood in conceptual or semantic terms, not in ontological terms” (29).
But I seeno reasonwhyheropponent should accept this. Certainworms thathad
important physical and social properties no longer exist. Other worms that con-
tinue existing as rubble did have such important properties but now lack them.
This last point relates to Baker’s tendency to assume that, unless one
believes Fs are essentially Fs, one does not take the existence of Fs seriously.
A person may think that Fs are very important and robustly real without hav-
ing to believe that they are essentially Fs. Baker says in defense of her idea that
automobiles are essentially automobiles that it “would be bizarre to suppose
that instruments of such monumental change were not kinds of genuine sub-
stances, or lacked ontological status” (66). This seems equally true, however, of
children. Children are genuine substances and have “ontological status.” Baker
herself, however, believes that children are not essentially children. Does this
mean Baker does not take children ontologically seriously? The natural answer
is that children are not ontologically special qua children but are so qua persons.
Furthermore, the property of being a child, though not essential to whoever has
it, is important inmany other ways. It seems similarly reasonable to say that auto-
mobiles may not be ontologically special qua automobiles but that the property
of being an automobile is an important one. It is very unclear to me that com-
mon sense is committed to rejecting this picture in favor of Baker’s, according
to which automobiles are essentially automobiles. Can’t we easily imagine a car
being converted into a boat, without thinking it stops existing? And if we can,
does that somehow lessen the reality of cars?
Baker’s own account of material objects is open to various objections. I
have space tomention only one. Baker’s account of persons seems committed to
the view that there are two persons coexisting in the same place at the same time
(thepersonand thebody that constituteshimorher,whichBaker says is a person
derivatively), which is absurd. Baker’s reply is that this objection assumes a view
of counting objects that she rejects.Whenone counts persons, one should count
the person and the body that constitutes her as one person (173).
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The problem with this approach is threefold. First, it still seems highly
problematic that there exists a person, x, in a certain location and a person, y,
who is not identical to x, in that exact same location. Even if one can legitimately
count them as one person, this does not resolve the initial worry. Second, it is
extremely natural to count by identity. It serves as the default view of counting
from which we should deviate only if completely necessary. Third, on Baker’s
view of counting, she is compelled to deny this seemingly obvious principle: the
number of Fs equals the number of Fs that are (F in a G way) plus the number
of Fs that are not (F in a G way). For instance, the number of aggressive people
equals the number of aggressive people who are aggressive in a passive way plus
thenumberof aggressivepeoplewhoarenot aggressive in apassiveway. It follows
from this principle that the number of people equals the number of people who
are people in a derivative way plus the number of people who are not people in
a derivative way. Given this principle and Baker’s constitution view, there are (at
least) double the number of people we think there are. Baker must thus reject
this very plausible principle.
I have concentrated on topics where I am not sympathetic with Baker’s
views. This should not be taken to imply that I did not find many of her ideas
insightful. Baker’s elucidation of the notion of the first-person perspective is
highly perceptive. Many of her insights about persons are independent of her
viewsaboutconstitutionandcanbeusedby thosewhobelieve thataperson is sim-
ply a body. Baker’s careful response to Kim’s exclusion argument also deserves
plenty of attention. In her discussion of time, Baker ingeniously rescues the idea
that, even though the past and future are real, there is something special about
the present (some event counts as occurring now if it occurs simultaneously with
an event of which a person is now “judgmentally aware”). Baker is to be com-
mended for creating a coherent and clearmetaphysics of the everyday.TheMeta-
physics of Everyday Life presents a view of the world thatmany will find compelling
and with which opponents will have to seriously contend.
Stephen Kearns
Cornell University
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Charles Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. vii + 277 pp.
In this volume Charles Larmore assembles nine essays published between 1999
and 2004, as well as a substantial and previously unpublished chapter on the
autonomy of morality. The first part of the book, “Reason and Reasons,” argues
that modern moral philosophy misconceives the relation between mind and
world and consequentlymisplaces the source of the authority of reasons.On the
naturalistmodel characteristic ofmodernity, reason is the active faculty that pro-
duces reasons and invests the world with its normativity. By contrast, Larmore
insists that “the world contains a normative dimension to which our reason is
responsive” (9). Reasons are irreducible normative relations that obtain inde-
pendently of the contribution of the mind and to which the mind is responsive
insofar as it is rational. The second part of the book, “The Moral Point of View,”
contains the main negative argument, which is the driving motive and common
theme of the essays; it attacks the Kantian claim that the authority of morality
derives from the pure activity of reason, which is a self-legislating enterprise. On
Larmore’s account, the claim about the independence of morality is a crippling
source of confusion, whose consequences are especially detrimental in ethics
and politics. The third part, “Political Principles,” is meant to show how deeply
theKantianmisconceptionof reasonasa self-legislatingactivity affects the liberal
understanding of democracy. While Larmore counts himself as an advocate of
liberalism, he thinks that “Rawls failed to find the right overall framework for his
thought” (71), and thus failed to provide liberalism with the appropriate foun-
dation. Larmore’s proposal is to supply a moral ontology and ground liberal-
ism on an unconstructed moral value: respect for persons. Respect for persons
has authority prior to and independently of the democratic order itself (9), and
therebymakes democracy possible, Larmore argues. In the fourth and final part
of the book, “Truth andChance,” Larmore explores the substantial issue of what
makes for our flourishing life and undermines the plausibility of conceiving of
livingwell in termsof livingaccording toaplan.Thekindof self-mastery required
in planning one’s life is a flawed ideal, which underestimates how deeply contin-
gency and change shape life and inform its conditions of success.
There is much to appreciate in Larmore’s unabashed defense of moral
realism. Its most distinctive merit consists in making room for contingency and
history within a realist framework. One needs to attend to the actual circum-
stances in order to ascertain the reasons, and these circumstances are sensitive
to time and subject to change. This concern with historicity, the most valuable
part ofHegel’s legacy,makesnoconcession to transcendence. IfLarmore’s acute
sense of contingency seems to align him with pragmatism, it is soon obvious
I would like to thank James Bondarchuk, Nataliya Palatnik, and Paul Schofield for their
comments.
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where they part ways. In response to Richard Rorty, Larmore argues that the
very practice of justificationmakes no sense without a substantive conception of
truth as correspondence, in the sense of “fitting the way the world really is” (28).
We come to grasp reasons through a learning process, which does not always
grant access to truth, but truth itself is timeless and independent of our imper-
fect efforts to reach it. Larmore’s allegiance to a Platonist form of realism also
explains his dissatisfaction with John McDowell’s treatment of the receptivity of
themind to theworld. In particular, Larmore contends thatMcDowell concedes
too much to naturalism when he places the source of normativity in education
and upbringing, rather than recognizing reasons as parts of the ontological fur-
nishing of the world (47–60).
How successful a moral theory of this sort might be depends crucially
on its details. As presented here, however, Larmore’s theory stands in need of
further elaboration and defense. It is thus difficult to judge whether it delivers
what it promises about the historicity of reasons and thus really improves upon
traditional forms of realism. For instance, he sounds at risk of ontological extrav-
agance when he says that moral reasons belong to “a third ontological dimen-
sion of the world” (63). This strong claim is unnecessary to support the irre-
ducible normativity of moral reasons and their relational and historical nature,
and thus it is redundant (11, 63). Kantians (as well as other nonrealists) would
concede that reasons are irreducible normative relations that are sensitive to cir-
cumstances. Unlike Larmore, they have the obvious advantage of avoiding any
talk of amysterious dimension of reality.
Furthermore, whether the conception of reason as a receptive faculty
supports moral realism importantly depends on how receptivity is cast. What
does the recognition of reasons involve? Again, Kantians may agree that to be
rational is to be sensitive and responsive to reasons; they differ as towhether such
sensitivity andresponsiveness is a totallypassiveoractiveaffair.Larmoreacknowl-
edges an inherent link between reason and freedom, as he interprets freedomas
“the ability to be moved by reasons, instead of by mere causes” (45). It is hard to
understand how the connection between freedomand reason is preserved if the
faculty of reason is totally passive.
The dichotomy between receptivity and activity is at the core of argu-
ments about the source of the authority of reasons. According to Larmore, Kant
and contemporary Kantian constructivistsmiss the realistic root of the normativ-
ity of reasons, and thus fail to explain howmoral claims have genuine authority.
His objection is that self-legislation is an activity that makes sense only after we
have recognized reasons as valid. Constructivism is thus incomplete (or unsta-
ble)because it buildsupona realist foundation: it has topresume theantecedent
validity of somemoral principles, for example, the principles of reasonableness
(83–84). To be genuinely authoritative, reasonmust be answerable to the exter-
nal world, which warrants that it does not go astray in its representations.
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Larmore’s attack is powerful enough to seriously undermine the volun-
tarist (and subjectivist) theories, which reduce the normative force of reasons to
amere subjectivedecision.WhetherKantian constructivismamounts to a subjec-
tivist form of voluntarism is, however, doubtful. Indeed, Kant holds that a princi-
ple cannotbinda rational agentunless it is one that theagent legislates.But this is
not to say that one is boundby requirements because one legislates them. In fact,
Kant’s appeal to self-legislation is meant to elucidate the constitutive principles
of the rational will, as opposed to the will of any one rational agent (Reath 2006,
92–170; Korsgaard 2008, 207–29). This distinction counts against readingKant’s
constructivism as a form of subjectivist voluntarism.
To prove his point, Larmore rightly focuses on Kant’s appeal to the “fact
of Reason,” a rather obscure argument that is unsurprisingly found missing in
contemporary defenses of constructivism (113). Whether the fact of Reason
really proves Kant to be a moral realist is, however, far from clear. The question
revolves around the status and role of reverence for the legislating activity and its
alleged equivalence to respect for humanity. The framework of the discussion is
the structureof the rationalwill, which is supposed tobe self-authenticating inso-
far as it is self-legislating. As Karl Ameriks remarks, for Kant the autonomy of rea-
sondoesnot simply refer to theoriginofprinciples but concerns the logical form
of the law (Ameriks 2003, 274–82). This is not to deny, as Larmore suggests in his
reply to Ameriks (46), that Kant’s appeal to self-legislation is meant to address
the issue of authority. The argument from the fact of Reason is directed to show
exactly the authority ofmoral reasons andour sensitivity or responsiveness to the
demands ofmorality (Kant [1795] 1902, 5:42–43, 46–48). This is an integral part
of Kant’s project of vindicating the objectivity of themoral law, which amounts to
showing thatpure reasonnotonlyprovides the standardsof valid reasoningbut is
also capable of producingmotives—inotherwords, that pure reason is practical.
Interestingly, Kant accounts for authority independently of validity.
Whether a consideration counts as a valid moral reason is determined by the
standards of the moral law, and thus independently of the subjectivity and self-
representation of agents. By contrast, authority names the subjective mode in
which validity is experienced. Without authority, the moral law would be valid
but inert, amere ideawithout application.Authority is felt in theguiseof respect.
Therefore, for Kant, respect (for the law-making activity and for persons, by an
equivalence that certainly requires further argument) plays a crucial role in the
justification of morality. Moreover, the objectivity of the moral law requires that
we are responsive (or receptive) to reasons. But this is no concession to moral
realism. To see why, consider that respect plays no epistemological role; it is not
the source ofmoral cognition. Rather, respect is the aspect of our sensibility that
makes us responsive to the requirements of reasons by directly providing us with
amoralmotive. It is the receptive (and yet not passive) aspect of the objectivity of
themoral law as it works in self-reflective embodiedminds (or animals endowed
with reason). That we are capable of acquiring an interest inmorality shows that
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reason is genuinely authoritative. The idea that practical reason “must construct
out of itself its own object” (Rawls 2002, 226) is thus not themove that severs the
relation between reason and the world, but the one that secures such a relation
by (ideally) identifying the appropriate moral motives.
Correctly understood, the claim about the autonomy and sovereignty
of reason decides the central issue that Larmore addresses, the justification of
morality (69–85). Larmore sides withM. Prichard in refusing to answer the nor-
mative question because it is ill-formed or unintelligible from within the prac-
tice ofmorality.He takes contemporary Kantians to be asking for reasons whywe
should be moral, and thus to be searching for an external source for validating
morality, via self-interest or rational freedom.But forKantianconstructivists, rea-
son is a self-conscious and self-authenticating activity. They clearly do not share
the view thatmorality needs an external foundation.On the contrary, they think
that in formingour intentions andbeliefsweareanswerable tocriteriaof correct-
ness that are internal to the very exercise of rationality (Korsgaard 2008, 13–15,
110–26, 207–29). Whether successful or not, the search for internal criteria of
authentication represents a third option besides refusing and searching for an
external foundation. It certainly has themerit of casting the issue of the justifica-
tion of morality in a way that does not make it spurious or insulated from other
domains of rationality.
In light of these considerations, it is hard to agree with Larmore’s diag-
nosis that constructivism builds upon a realist foundation (84), and to dismiss it
as “an untenable account of what makes for the authority of moral and political
principles” (71). It looks as though Kantian constructivism is preoccupied with
“the responsiveness to reasons which reasoning involves” (86) and represents a
genuine alternative to moral realism. Until issues concerning the ontology and
epistemology of reasons are further clarified and qualified, it seems premature
to conclude that “ifmorality is a rational enterprise there isnowayaroundhaving
to recognize thatwe takeourmoral bearings froman independent order of right
and wrong” (84).
That said, Larmore’s book should be welcomed as a fundamental con-
tribution to moral and political theory, as it directly and fruitfully addresses two
themes that deserve to be the focus of philosophical debate, the objectivity of
morality and the historicity of reasons.
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Alexander Nehamas,Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in aWorld of
Art. Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2007. xi + 186 pp.
Most contemporary philosophical accounts of beauty have a decidedly Kantian
flavor and can therefore often be overly clinical and frustratingly aloof, beauty as
divorced from rather than entwined with the everyday world. In stark contrast to
this, Alexander Nehamas’s Only a Promise of Happiness offers a refreshingly inti-
mate, impassioned, and accessible account of beauty, an account that returns
beauty to its more romantic and alsomore dangerous roots.
In the first section, Nehamas addresses the change over time undergone
by philosophical approaches to beauty—themoral of which appears to be “Plato
was right, Kant was wrong.” For Plato, beauty is sensual, pervasive, and passion-
ate, the driving force behind philosophy itself. On such accounts, beauty is a
provinceof theeverydayworld, evokingand inseparable fromstrongdesire, forg-
ing an intimate connection with practical and ethical interests. Kant’s account
of beauty, however, signals an end of the connection between beauty and desire.
For Kant, both the agreeable and the good are robustly dependent on desire or
interest; the beautiful contrastingly requires the absence of such dependence—
a thing’s beauty must be independent from that thing’s purpose, use, or value.
As Nehamas rightly observes, this highly influential notion of beauty marks the
beginning of the end for a plebian notion of beauty in favor of a highly intellec-
tualized notion, specifically a notion of beauty in the arts as separate and distinct
from the everyday world.
In the last century whilemodernismwagedwar on the value and place of
beauty in the arts, contemporary philosophy, following Kant’s lead, proceeded
to de-fang, sterilize, and rarefy beauty—arguably reaching its absurd conclu-
sion in Clive Bell’s idea of significant form. For much of the latter half of the
twentieth century, philosophical aesthetics has been dominated by the attempt
to define art in aesthetic terms while preserving the art object/natural object
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divide. Lumping beauty in with other aesthetic properties (for example, dain-
tiness, elegance), Nehamas contends, further distances beauty from the every-
day world in favor ofmore dispassionately analytic (and farmore ill-defined and
problematic) neo-Kantian notions like the “aesthetic attitude,” “aesthetic expe-
rience,” and “aesthetic disinterestedness.” As a result beauty becomes by associa-
tion a distinctly surface property, exhausted by appearance—little mystery then
whymodernism rejected the value of beauty in art.
Nehamas then draws a parallel between the interplay of criticism and
evaluation and the judgment of beauty. Should a critic inform me of all of the
descriptive features of an artwork, this fails to informme how I will be affected; I
must see formyself. “If I trust the reviewer and find the praise tempting enough,
I will look at the work formyself, hoping to like it but not in order to do so” (53).
Likewise, for Nehamas, judgments of beauty are not verdicts, proceeding from
analysis and reflection on experience; rather judgments of beauty are commit-
ments to the future. This is the crux of Nehamas’s account of beauty. Hand in
hand go beauty and desire (though desire that refuses to disclose its purpose).
Should I find an object beautiful, I desire to have that object inmy life, to devote
part of my life, however small, to it. Since, for Nehamas, beauty is always, though
never completely,manifest in appearance, the reasons formefinding something
beautiful arenever fully available tome. If I findanobject beautiful, I believe that
there is more to learn, more to come, and what is yet to come is worth my devo-
tion. Of course, we all know these things can go horribly awry; beauty is, after
all, only a promise of happiness. This reveals a darkly tragic (or darkly comic) ele-
ment tobeauty, that is, beauty sparks thedesire tounderstandonly to vanishonce
understood.
Nehamas cleverly avoids discussing judgments of beauty in terms of
objectivity and subjectivity, opting for the more nuanced notions of the com-
munal and the personal. When I judge something to be beautiful, according to
Nehamas, I do not, as a Kantian might think, command universal agreement.
Judgments of beauty are personal , and communities are established around such
judgments of beauty, yet no community is universal. Moreover, this is exactly the
state of affairs we ought to prefer. What frightens Nehamas, and rightly so, is not
finding out, per his example, that everyone likes Baywatch but finding out that
everyone likes the same thing regardless of what that thing may be. Since judg-
mentsofbeauty forNehamas comeprepackagedwithahost ofunansweredques-
tions, theymay subtly or drastically direct the course of one’s life, leading one to
“other people, other objects, other habits and ways of being” (85).
Nehamas ends the book by detailing his love affair withManet’sOlympia.
Part of finding an artwork or a person beautiful is trying to understand the rea-
sons for finding it beautiful, to come to know and fully understand it (and con-
sequently to no longer find it beautiful). To know and understand the object of
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beauty is to understand how that object is distinct from everything else, and so,
Nehamas argues, beauty enjoins interaction with rather than distance from the
everydayworld.Ofcourse,Nehamascorrectlypointsout that artworks arenobet-
ter orworse at being objects of beauty thannonart, and as such, he is able to keep
his notion of beauty separate and distinct from notions of art and artworld func-
tions. ForNehamas there is no artworld beauty versus plebian beauty, no refined
versus unrefined beauty, no beauty versus beauty*—there is just beauty. Finding
an artwork beautiful promises no more or less happiness than finding a rock
formation or a lover beautiful. Each thing found beautiful promises happiness
unique to it, but all such promises share a darkly capricious nature.
Only a Promise of Happiness obviously targets a much wider audience than
professional philosophers, so much so that I suspect that art critics and art his-
torians would get much more out of the book than philosophers of art. The
first section of the book, however, should be required reading in any course on
beauty if only to act as a cautionary tale, reminding us just how sanitized contem-
porary notions of beauty have become. The remainder of the book should be
seen less as a rigorous, positive account of beauty and more as a template for a
rigorous, positive account of beauty. One of the book’s more frustrating aspects
is that Nehamas (admittedly) offers decidedly imprecise accounts of some par-
ticularly troublesome notions, most notably with respect to interpretation (its
objects, goals, and where it begins and ends) and what it is to be an aesthetic
feature. Moreover, by making judgments of beauty identical to the “spark of
desire,” Nehamas’s account merely raises more questions, questions that can-
not be answered by appeal to the far too broad and imprecise notion of devo-
tional desire employed.Only a Promise of Happiness should be seen less as provid-
ing an account of beauty andmore as imparting a lesson about what we ought to
demand of any such account, namely that beauty essentially involves desire and
that the judgments of beautywemake informus about theworld aswell as inform
the world about us.
Christy Mag Uidhir
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Giannis Stamatellos, Plotinus and the Presocratics: A Philosophical Study of Presocratic
Influences in Plotinus’ “Enneads.” Albany: SUNY Press, 2007. xi + 270 pp.
Plotinus obviously read and thought about Plato a great deal. Yet his student
Porphyry, in his Life of Plotinus, took pains to emphasize that his master’s philo-
sophical interests and influences extended way beyond the Corpus Platonicum.
He tells us that much Peripatetic and Stoic material is contained in the Enneads
and that treatises by Severus, Cronius, Numenius, Gaius, Atticus, Aspasius, and
Alexander were all read in the seminars (VP 14). What is striking about this
list is that it shows that Porphyry’s real concern was to make clear that Plotinus
had been keeping up with the philosophical literature produced since Plato’s
time, which raises the question of Plotinus’s knowledge of and engagement with
Preplatonic philosophy. To this interesting and important question Giannis Sta-
matellos has now devoted an entire monograph.
This is surely a timely study.With theviabilityof the traditionaldistinction
between genuine fragments and mere testimonies coming increasingly under
fire and the massive new multivolume edition of the Presocratics by Gemelli
Marciano,McKirahan, Primavesi, Riedweg, Strohmaier, andWo¨hrle alreadywell
under way (an edition that aims to provide a level of completeness that Diels’s
pedagogically oriented volumes were never intended to achieve in its documen-
tationof the transmissionofearlyGreekphilosophy throughoutclassical and late
antiquity), this seems to be the perfect time to reflect on a cluster of issues sur-
rounding late antique philosophers and the Presocratics. Indeed, Stamatellos’s
book raises a number of problems worthy of study, most of which go in one of
two obviously not unrelated interrogative directions: What can we learn about
Plotinus from the Presocratics? And what can we learn about the Presocratics
from Plotinus?
In the former direction we encounter a series of questions having to do
with the influence that the Presocratics had on Plotinus, which, as the book’s
subtitle makes clear, represent Stamatellos’s primary focus. Here Stamatellos
appears to have three central aims. He wants to show, first, that Plotinus has in-
herited concepts and terminology from the Presocratics, second, that Plotinus
generally treats the Presocratics with reverence and is interested in showing
his philosophy as being continuous with the older Greek tradition to which
they belong, and third, that he remains nonetheless critical of the Presocrat-
ics, though his criticisms are largely original and the result of his approaching
the Presocratics as serious philosophers engaged in the same kind of project
that he is. In the other direction Stamatellos wants to correct a perceived bias
against Plotinus as a source of information on early Greek philosophy. Whereas
scholars of Plotinus and the Presocratics alike have traditionally been skep-
tical of Plotinus’s value here, Stamatellos insists that many previously disre-
gardedpassages fromtheEnneads areof “greatphilosophical anddoxographical
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importance” to our understanding of the Presocratics (140). Stamatellos
advances toward these goals thematically, with separated chapters devoted to the
One(23–58), Intellect andBeing(59–88),Eternity andTime(89–134), andMat-
ter and Soul (135–72), followed by an appendix (177–95) and an index fontium
(255–58). Stamatellos follows roughly the samemethod in each chapter, first giv-
ing a very helpful overview of the Plotinian theory, then discussing selected con-
ceptually related ideas from the Presocratics—often giving synopses of scholarly
disputes over their interpretation—andultimately arguing for some connection
between the former and the latter that advances the aims outlined above.
Stamatellos does a good job at developing readings of the Presocratics
that make the parallels with Plotinus more obvious. He presents many strik-
ing examples and generally succeeds in showing that Plotinus had a much
more active engagement with the Presocratics than was previously thought.
Stamatellos’s discussion of Parmenides is particularly effective, with concrete
conclusions being reached in each of the above directions. Although the
Eleatics did employ the monistic language of the “One,” Plotinus consistently
related their accounts to his Intellect, and in addition to elucidating a number
of aspects of this Eleatic influence, Stamatellos turns around and argues that
Plotinus’s routine use of in connection with the realm of Being provides
good additional reason for retaining the (over , as suggested by
some Parmenides scholars) in Parmenides fr. 1.29 (88). Elsewhere, however,
the connections drawn between the Presocratics and Plotinus seem much
more tenuous. Often Stamatellos appears content to show that certain ideas
or concepts that were first articulated in some form by a Presocratic are still
to be found in the Enneads, regardless of whether this inheritance was direct
or indirect, conscious or unconscious. Thus we often encounter rather vague
language of Plotinus “echoing” the Presocratics. When Plotinus identifies
eternity with the life of the forms, is he really being influenced by Empedocles’
concept of as endless life (119)? Likewise, is Plotinus’s account of the
circularmotion of fire in II.2.1.27–37 really influenced by Presocratic appeals to
a vortex (132)? Does Plotinus’s apophatism of theOne really owe a “significant”
debt to Anaximander’s negative predication of the (35)? These are all
described as cases of Plotinus “echoing” Presocratics, but surely are doubtful
cases of substantial influence. All of these “references,” “allusions,” and “echoes”
are then catalogued in an appendix, which aims to collect the passages from
the Enneads in which one finds “direct and indirect references to the text
of Presocratic fragments,” by which Stamatellos means that the reference
must have at least one significant word in common with the fragment, and in
an index fontium, which includes all of these references plus references to
testimonies as well as other references containing no overlap in terminology.
I am very sympathetic to this compilation project, though the boundaries of
inclusion are sure to be blurry, as is well illustrated by the cases of Anaxagoras’s
(B1.1, B4.3, and B6.7 D–K) and Pherecydes’ description of the
544
B O O K R E V I E W S
Dyad as (B14 D–K). Surely not every occurrence of these expressions
should be counted as a reference to these Presocratic thinkers, as Stamatellos
acknowledges (for example, 20), yet Stamatellos proposes credible principles
of inclusion, for example, only those instances of and where the
generation of plurality is at issue (170) are references to Pherecydes. This is
solid methodology, though given the nature of the project, the results are sure
to be contentious. (Why include III.6.18.35–6 and VI.3.1.17 as references to
Anaxagoras’s but not include II.4.11.16, V.8.10.18, VI.6.15.3,
VI.7.2.53, and especially VI.2.2.20–21 This
is made more difficult by Stamatellos’s discussion on pages 56–57, where he
concludes “we cannot assume that Plotinus traces back to Anaxagoras in the
above passages,” yet all of the passages in question [listed in footnotes 167–72]
are included in the index fontium.)
It is worth noting that at times the discussion is more streamlined than
is advantageous to such a project. For example, although Stamatellos devotes
a full five pages (123–28) to a discussion of II.1.2.10–12 and its relation to
Heraclitus fr. 6, many important issues are left untouched. Conche (He´raclite
Fragments [Paris 1986]) has questioned the scope of fr. 6, in particular whether
Aristotle’s is indeed a part of the original fragment,
and while Plotinus’s seems relevant to this debate, Stamatellos leaves all
of this aside. More troubling still is that Stamatellos simply gives the text of
H-S2(
) without any acknowledgment that H-S3 emend to in
order to allow for a closer parallel with Aristotle’sMeteo. 355a12–14, which they
assume to be Plotinus’s source. This omission is particularly problematic since
Stamatellos wants to challenge their assumption and make Plato’s Cratylus 402a
the source. (But H-S must be correct. Unlike theMeteorology, the Cratylus makes
no specific mention of the sun, and the reference to “so-called nourishment”
in II.1.4.3 provides additional evidence for the Meteorology as the source here
[see Wilberding, Plotinus’ Cosmology (Oxford 2006), ad II.1.4.3]). Yet these are
precisely the issues that a book like this should be providing authoritative
conclusions on.
All in all this is a successful book, though one that leaves much room
for future studies. The real question that we would like answered is not whether
there are some remnants of Presocratic thought in the Enneads—obviously
there are—but rather to what extent (if any) Presocratic ideas are finding their
way directly into the Enneads without being predigested by earlier Platonists,
Peripatetics, and Stoics such as the ones Porphyry lists in VP 14; but this appears
to be a question in which Stamatellos has only limited interest. Evaluating the
extent to which Heraclitus, for example, is directly influencing Plotinus would
require much more engagement with the Stoics than one finds here. Likewise,
Stamatellos’s conclusion that “Plotinus’ interpretation indicates a much closer
acquaintance with Presocratic texts and a better understanding of their ways of
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thinking than does Plato (and indeed Aristotle)” (173) lacks the support that
only a more thorough examination of Plato and Aristotle could provide. The
question, inotherwords, iswhether therearePresocratic ideas thatarenot found
in Plato and Postplatonic philosophy but that do turn up again in the Enneads.
One avenue of exploration here that strikes me as rather promising concerns
Plotinus’s somewhat shocking thesis of III.8 that all life is a form of contempla-
tion. This is at least arguably better represented in Presocratic philosophy (com-
pare Thales A22 D–K, Diogenes B5 D–K, and Empedocles B110 D–K) than in
PlatoandPostplatonicphilosophers.AnothermightbePlotinus’s interpretation
in II.1.6–7 of Plato’sTimaeus 31b4–32c4, as thisTimaeus passagewas oftenunder-
stood in an Anaxagorean manner to mean that all elements had to be mixed in
witheachother (forexample, Simplicius InDC 17.25–26,PhiloponusAgainst Pro-
clus 514.13–16, Proclus In Tim. 2.42.28ff.), though even here the Stoics might
have prepared the way (see A. Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics [Leiden 1972],
37–28). Be that as it may, Porphyry and Stamatellos are surely both right to
remind us that Plato, even if he is Plotinus’s foremost philosophical authority,
is only one of many figures that we encounter in the Enneads.
James Wilberding
Newcastle University, England, UK
Philosophical Review, Vol. 118, No. 4, 2009
DOI 10.1215/00318108-2009-020
Jonathan Barnes, Truth, etc.: Six Lectures on Ancient Logic.
Oxford andNew York: Oxford University Press, 2007. x + 551 pp.
This book contains a revised version of Jonathan Barnes’s 2004 John Locke
Lectures, the masterly synthesis of a lifetime’s study of ancient logic. It covers,
thoughnot in a strictly systematicmanner, a very extensive territory, confronting
many of the subject’s major issues and indulging along the way in a number of
divagations, theoretical or erudite. It is as acute, rigorous, clear, learned, and
witty as youwould expect it to be. Anyoneworking in thehistory of logic will want
tomeditate upon this magnificent work.
The book is strongly focused on the texts, in the sense that Barnes pro-
ceeds by translating relevant ancient passages (even fairly long ones), always
adding the original in a footnote, and then going on to discuss them in
considerable detail, often substantiating his remarks by means of further quota-
tions. Thus the book constitutes, among other things, a formidable collection of
texts; and part of the reason why it “can be read in an armchair,” as the jacket
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half-jokingly states, is that it is (to some extent) a self-sufficient tool. Barnes’s
decision todispense altogetherwith references to scholarly literature is probably
also intended to balance the amount of space taken up by this wealth of primary
material.
Chapter 1 addresses a number of issues concerning ancient views on
truth. It centers on Cicero’s report that Chrysippus took pains to prove, whereas
Epicurus had denied, that “every assertible is true or false” (De fato 21). Barnes
gives a clear reconstruction of this ancient quarrel about bivalence (23–27),
which had to do with future contingents. Both parties agreed that bivalence
about future contingents entails determinismabout them; andwhileChrysippus
accepted both things, Epicurus rejected both.
Besides exploring this larger context, Barnes identifies several differ-
ences between Chrysippus’s bivalence thesis itself and the modern Principle of
Bivalence. The most interesting one is that “in the Chrysippean thesis—and in
ancient logic quite generally—truth-values are timed,” not timeless as in post-
Fregephilosophyof logic.Barnesdevotesa longdiscussion(5–64) to this fact and
to itsmost important consequence, namely that it is possible for a truth-bearer to
change its truth-value through time, as Aristotle explicitly states in Categories 5.
Perhaps his main reason for rejecting the Aristotelian view is this: “Let truth-
values change fromtime to time if youwill—but in that case, consistency requires
you to let them vary from place to place and from person to person” (50). He
especially insists on the parallel between time and place and exploits it to argue
that “in general, where at first blush it seems plausible to find a single assertible
whichhasdifferent truth-valuesatdifferent timesor indifferentplaces, at second
blush things are seen to be otherwise: either there is a single assertible, and it is
false [because it lacks necessary qualifications of time/place], or else there are
two ormore assertibles with different truth-values” (55).
Chapter 2 is about predication. Among other things, Barnes discusses the
relation between the name/verb distinction and the subject/predicate distinc-
tionandaskswhat subjects andpredicates are supposed tobe inAristotelian logic
(100–123). With regard to the latter question, he shows that Porphyry’s answer,
that subjects and predicates are linguistic expressions, is at least as good as the
rival answer that they are entities, because the Aristotelian texts vacillate.
One of the chapter’s most interesting sections deals with the role of sin-
gular terms in Aristotle’s syllogistic (154–67). Barnes argues—convincingly—
that some of Aristotle’s examples and theoretical pronouncements in the
Analytics actually commit him to acknowledging some role for singular terms.
This is of course problematic; for only quantified sentences may feature in Aris-
totelian syllogistic, and singular termsdonot takequantifiers.Barnes’s suggested
way of finding quantifiers for singular subjects (which he partly grounds in a
peculiar construal of An. Pr. 47b35–36) is to paraphrase any singular subject ‘X’
as ‘itemwhich is the sameasX’.Thus ‘Socrates is pale’ becomes ‘itemwhich is the
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same as Socrates is pale’—an indefinite sentence, whichwe can interpret either as
particular or, equivalently, as universal.
Earlier (142–54) Barnes discusses the views of Aristotle and his commen-
tators on the transitivity of predication. He spots some remarks in Porphyry and
Simplicius which appear to imply that it is not predication in general that is tran-
sitive but only what theCategories calls predication “as-of-a-subject,” namely essen-
tial predication. This view entails disastrous consequences for syllogistic, which
rests on the assumption that universal affirmative predication is in general tran-
sitive. Indeed, Barnes blames the commentators’ false view on Aristotle’s Cate-
gories, where predication as-of-a-subject is said to be transitive. But I do not see
why this—or any other piece of evidence I know of—should imply that the Cate-
gories denies that generic predication is transitive as well, namely that inferences
like ‘Capable-of-laughing holds of musical; musical holds of Socrates; therefore
capable-of-laughing holds of Socrates’ are valid.
In chapter 3 Barnes turns to ancient conceptions of connectors (his trans-
lationof theGreek ).Most of the chapter (168–216) is devoted to estab-
lishing that no ancient philosopher or grammarian (not even Apollonius Dysco-
lus, despite what is often thought) held, or held consistently, the view that the
main if not the only function of such words as ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if’, and so forth is to
connect whole sentences. Thus, for example, the Stoics conceived of connectors
as linking individual parts of speech to one another—which led them to reckon
prepositions among them. This is especially striking in light of the fact that sen-
tential connectives played a vital role in Stoic logic.
Chapter 4 investigates to what extent the ancient logicians were theoret-
ically alive to the notion of an argument’s being valid in virtue of its instantiating
a certain logical form, in what terms they expressed that notion, and how they con-
cretely specified the logical form of an argument (286–98).
The ancient logicians often specify a logical form both descriptively (for
example, “There is a syllogism which, from a conditional and the opposite of
its consequent, infers the opposite of its antecedent”: this is what Alexander of
Aphrodisias calls a “circumscription”) and schematically (“If the 1st, the 2nd; but
not the 2nd; therefore not the 1st”: this is called a “mode” in Stoic logic). Barnes
notes that sometimes there is a mismatch between the two specifications, in that
the former is more general than the latter. This is doubtless right, generally
speaking;but I amnotequally convincedbyallofBarnes’s examples. In theabove
case he holds that the circumscription is, while the mode is not, instantiated by
the argument ‘If she is not in Italy, then she is not in Milan; but she is in Milan;
therefore she is in Italy’. He could at least have considered the possibility that
the Stoics, who assumed that ‘P’ is logically equivalent to ‘not-not-P’ (Diogenes
Laertius 7.69), regarded the argument as instantiating a logically equivalent
mode, and hence themode as essentially matching the circumscription.
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From the relationship between circumscriptions and schemata Barnes
moves on to consider schemata in their own right (322–59). He offers a nice dis-
cussion of the use of numerals (“the 1st”, “the 2nd”) as stand-ins for “assertibles”
in Stoic modes. Then he comes to the use of letters in the Analytics and analyzes
such Aristotelian formulas as “the A holds of none of the Bs.” The comparison
with the use of letters in Greek geometry, and indeed the reasonable hypothe-
sis that Aristotle’s use of letters actually derives from geometry, suggests that the
Aristotelian letters in their typical use are not variables but constants, namely
stand in for “determinate predicative expressions” (as they sometimes do on any
interpretation). Likewise the letters in geometry designate individual geometri-
cal entities, which geometers “set out” in order to conduct their proof in relation
to an individual case that eventually becomes the basis for a universal generaliza-
tion; likewise in natural deduction systems the letters ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, and so forth are
used as singular terms, to which a rule of universal generalization is applied.
This much constitutes a fairly standard picture, which Barnes enriches
in two ways. First, he shows that it has some footing—however insecure—in the
work of some ancient commentators. Secondly, he asks how exactly the letters
can manage to express universality. Barnes rails against the view that the indi-
vidual constants of contemporary logic designate arbitrarily chosen objects: ran-
dom selection does not protect you from the danger of unwarranted generaliza-
tions. “What matters . . . is not how the individual objects are chosen but how
they are employed: whether the objects are called up at random or elected after
the most punctilious examination, things will go well if and only if no appeal is
made to any of their peculiarities” (351). So the letters must have a determinate
meaning—which however it is up to us (to each of us) to determine as we wish.
This is the real guarantee of the proof’s universality.
Very subtle; and yet there remains room for some marginal complaint.
On the one hand, in his criticism Barnes takes ‘arbitrary’ tomean ‘random’; but
‘arbitrary’may alsomeanprecisely ‘up tous todetermine asweplease’—aswhen
we say that themeaningof ordinarynames is arbitrary.On theother,Barnes could
havementioned Posterior Analytics 1.4, where Aristotle says that something holds
universally only if it is proved “of a chance case” ( ): is he, after all,
thinking of randomly selected objects?
Chapter 5 starts with an excellent account of Aristotelian syllogistic as
an axiomatized deductive system. Then it turns to the alleged “perfection” or
evident validity of first figure syllogisms (378–419). Barnes argues that Aristotle
takes theevident validityoffirstfigure syllogisms tobeunderwrittenby thedictum
de omni et nullo, namelyby themeaningof theexpressions “[predicated]of every”
and “[predicated] of no” as explained in Prior Analytics 1.1. Barnes goes through
several possible ways of making sense of this and rejects them all, coming to a
drastic and depressing conclusion: “no predicative syllogism, pace Aristotle and
his Peripatetics, is perfect” (417).
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The remainder of the chapter (419–47) is devoted to “Galen’smetatheo-
rem,” according to which the validity of most syllogisms depends on the truth of
universal axioms. Barnes advances the elegant suggestion that (at least as far as
underived syllogistic forms are concerned) the axiom on which the validity of a
syllogism S depends is not itself a premise of S but is what we get when we take
the conditional corresponding to S and generalize it. For example, from “All
humans are animals; all animals are substances; therefore all humans are sub-
stances” we get “For any X, Y and Z, if every X is Y, and every Y is Z, then every X
is Z”; and from ‘If it is day, it is light; it is day; therefore it is light’ we get ‘For any
P andQ, if (if P, thenQ) and P, thenQ’.
All ancient logicians believed that syllogisms constitute only a subset of
valid arguments; but different logicians and different schools drew different dis-
tinctions between the two sets. Chapter 6 discusses at length Alexander’s and
Galen’s logical utilitarianism, according to which an argument is a syllogism if
and only if its logical form is suitable for scientific proofs. One particular appli-
cation of this general stance that Barnes takes into account (487–517) is the
rejection—already implied by Aristotle’s own definition of syllogism—of Stoic
circular arguments, in which the conclusion is identical with one of the prem-
ises. Another case (463–87) is Galen’s lack of interest in modal logic, which
Barnes explains as due to a correct appreciation of the fact that modal logic is
useless for scientificproof, despitewhatAristotle seems to suggest. It is useless for
proofbecause, although thepropositionsofAristotelian sciencedohaveamodal
status (those of some sciences are necessarily true, those of others only possibly
so), they are not modalized, namely do not carry the modal operator ‘Necessar-
ily’ or ‘Possibly’. Another and final case (518–26) is Galen’s view that arguments
based on negated conjunctions, like the third Stoic unproved (‘Not both P and
Q; but P; therefore not -Q’), are useless for proof. Barnes acutely supposes that
Galen’s point is that either the negated conjunction actually means that P and Q
are in conflict, and hence is equivalent to ‘If P, then not -Q’, or we cannot use
such an argument to prove its conclusion because then we can establish its com-
plex premise only by first establishing its conclusion. Consider: “Locke wasn’t
both a philosopher and an historian; Locke was a philosopher; therefore Locke
wasn’t an historian.”
This review gives only an idea of the book’s riches.One general feature is
especially remarkable. In discussing a particular issueBarnes usually takes all the
time that it takes to unfold patiently various possible lines of interpretation one
after another, bringingout all their implications beforedecidingwhich to adopt,
if any (he does not fear agnosticism). This may sometimes prove a bit tiring; but
it is more often illuminating. It is as if we were allowed to watch a great scholar’s
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thought in the making—and in quest for nothing less than the truth about its
subject.1
1. The volume contains a certain number of misprints. For example, the argument’s
letters at 227 are mistaken; at 329 for “X⊃ Y; X: Z” read either “X⊃ Y; X: Y” or “X⊃ Z; X:
Z”; at 376 for “from Celarent to Cesare” read “for Celarent from Cesare”; at 407 for “but
that . . . therefore this” read “but this . . . therefore that.”
Francesco Ademollo
Liceo Classico Galileo, Florence, Italy
Philosophical Review, Vol. 118, No. 4, 2009
DOI 10.1215/00318108-2009-021
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and Rene´ Descartes, The Correspondence between
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and Rene´ Descartes. Edited and translated by Lisa
Shapiro. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. xxviii + 246 pp.
Beginning in 1643, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia corresponded with Descartes
about mind-body interaction, the compatibility of human free will and divine
providence, and themoral psychology of regret—amongother topics. These let-
ters are included in the standardeditionofDescartes’swork.1 Portionshavebeen
translated into English, and selected letters have been reprinted in a collection
of excerpts from the writings of early modern women philosophers.2 But for all
this, Lisa Shapiro’s edition is the first English translation of the complete, extant
Princess Elisabeth-Descartes correspondence.
One might wonder why this is so, especially since the correspondence
contains Descartes’s most detailed responses to questions about mind-body
1. Rene´ Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris:
Cerf, 1897–1913; reprint, Paris: Vrin, 1996).
2. Anthony Kenny and Robert Stoothoff, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,
vol. 3, ed. and trans. John Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), provide translations only of selected letters fromDescartes’s side of the correspon-
dence. English translations of selected letters from both sides of the exchange can be
found in John Blom, Descartes: His Moral Philosophy and Psychology (New York: New York
University Press, 1978) andAndreaNye,The Princess and the Philosopher: Letters of Elisabeth of
the Palatine to Rene´ Descartes (Lanham,MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999). However, since
Nye’s book does not aim to be a scholarly treatment, all comparisons of Shapiro’s transla-
tions will be to those of either Kenny and Stoothoff or Blom. Blom’s translations of several
letters in the correspondence have been included inWomen Philosophers of the Early Modern
Period, ed. Margaret Atherton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994).
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interaction and the bulk of Descartes’s scant remarks about morals and politics.
It is also curious that the complete Elisabeth side of the correspondence has not
appeared in English until now, given increasing interest in reconstructing early
modern women’s own philosophical views and not simply their criticisms of the
male figures’ views. However, the status of the manuscript letters, their prove-
nance, and their dating have constituted significant editorial hurdles. AndElisa-
beth’s status as a genuine philosopher has come in for question in the literature.
The first job an editor of a correspondence must attend to is the exam-
ination of the original letters or copies of the letters.3 But, until now, access to
copies of the letters has not been possible for many twentieth-century editors.
In brief, the history is this: Elisabeth’s side of the correspondence was never
published in the seventeenth or eighteenth century.4 There appears to have
been no trace of the letters until Alexander Foucher de Careil identified doc-
uments, found in Rosendael Castle near Arnhem, as the Elisabeth letters; he
published them in 1879.5 But at some point, between 1935 and the castle’s ren-
ovation in 1985–90, the letters went missing again. Theo Verbeek and his col-
leagues have recently located them at long last, only to find that the recovered
letters are not seventeenth-century originals or copies, but eighteenth-century
copies.6 Whether there is an extant seventeenth-century copy remains un-
known. Shapiro’s volume gives the details of the provenance of the manuscript
letters and becomes a landmark edition in that it is the first English translation
of the correspondence to be based on an examination of what is presumably
the closest thingwehave to the original Elisabeth letters: the eighteenth-century
copies first published by Foucher de Careil.
An editor of these letters must also face problems concerning the dating
of the letters. Shapiro follows the dating in the Arnhemmanuscript when Adam
andTannery have provided no good reason to choose the Julian over theGrego-
rian calendar year dating, or vice versa. Blom’s edition typically, however, blindly
followsAdamandTannery and yet fails to follow them in revising the alleged July
1647 letter to July 1644. In contrast, Shapiro’s dating of the letters is careful and
consistent.
Further, an editormust also respond to the criticism that while the corre-
spondence may be of philosophical interest for the light it sheds on Descartes’s
3. That is what Messieurs Adam and Tannery did for their 1897–1913 edition, and
what Jacques Chevalier later did for his edition of the correspondence, Lettres sur la morale
(Paris: Boivin, 1935).
4. After Descartes’s death, Elisabeth had her letters to him returned to her and
she refused to grant permission to publish them. Her intention was to have the letters
destroyed.
5. Alexandre Foucher de Careil, Descartes, la Princesse Elisabeth et la Reine Christine
(Paris/Amsterdam: Germer-Ballie`re/Muller, 1879).
6. The Correspondence of Rene´ Descartes 1643, ed. Theo Verbeek, Erik-Jan Bos, and
Jeroen Van de Ven (Utrecht: Zeno Institute for Philosophy, 2003).
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views, it fails to present us with a female philosopher in her own right—awoman
with systematic, original, philosophical views of her own, who would have been
perceived as a philosopher by her contemporaries.7 With respect to Elisabeth’s
own philosophical views, Shapiro’smain interpretive contribution is her sugges-
tion that Elisabeth’s commitment to mechanical explanation “leads her to try
to develop an account of mind—of human capacity for reason and reflection—
that is materialist, thereby allowing for an efficient causal explanation of the
way our thoughts and bodily states move one another” (40). Of course, one
can be a mechanist without endorsing a materialist account of the mind; con-
sider Descartes’s dualistic position, according to which mechanism accounts
only for purely bodily change but not purely mental or mind-body activity. But
Shapiro thinks it is Elisabeth’s demand that “one theoretical framework be able
to explain the whole of nature” that drives her attempt to produce a material-
ist account of mind (40). Elisabeth is only interested in exploring a material-
ist theory of mind that does not reduce thought to bodily motions. Thus, she
would reject aHobbesian account ofmind. Shapiro reads her argument as a typ-
ical seventeenth-century argument from conceivability: while extension is not
necessary for pure thought, it is nonetheless not inconsistent with thought; it is
conceivable that extension is suited to another essential function of the mind.
Elisabeth concludes from this that, contra Descartes, it is possible that mind/
thought is not “an entity capable of subsisting in itself, suspended separate from
body” (44).
This interpretation may be correct. However, as even Shapiro admits, it
is a somewhat speculative reading of the extant letters, which come to a puzzling
halt on the topic of mind-body interaction in mid-discussion. Perhaps there are
missing letters that clarify Elisabeth’s decided views. But given the extant letters,
it is not obvious to me that she is committed to developing a materialist account
of mind. She does say: “I admit it would be easier for me to concede matter and
extension to the soul than to concede the capacity to move a body and to be
moved by it to an immaterial thing” (68), but goes on to say: “I entertain these
sentiments only as friends which I do not intend to keep, assuring myself that
you will explicate the nature of an immaterial substance and the manner of its
actions and passion in the body” (68). Perhaps Elisabeth is just demanding that
Descartes justify his rejection of this possibility, in light of her specific challenges
to Descartes’s dualistic interactionism.
To be sure, in her later letter of July 1, 1643, Elisabeth claims that
Descartes has not yet said enough about mind-body interaction to justify her
7. See, for example, Lilli Alanen “Descartes and Elisabeth: A Philosophical Dia-
logue?,” in Feminist Reflections on theHistory of Philosophy, ed. Lilli Alanen andCharlotteWitt
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004) for a response to Daniel Garber’s argu-
ments in support of this criticism in his unpublished “Elisabeth of Bohemia: A Learned
Maid?”
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in giving up “her friends.” She also says: “Though extension is not necessary to
thought, neither is it at all repugnant to it” (42), thus rejecting (or possibly show-
ing shedoes not understand)Descartes’s epistemic argument formind-bodydis-
tinctness. But rather than ending the letter on this note, she writes: “I will lose all
hope of finding certitude in anything in the world if you, who alone have kept
me from being a skeptic, do not answer that to which my first reasoning car-
ried me” (72). It is possible that, absent a satisfactory response from Descartes,
Elisabeth would not have retained amaterialist account ofmind andwould have
abandoned this “friend”—remaining a skeptic about this matter, in accordance
with themethod of doubt about things not clearly and distinctly perceived.
Shapiro does as fine a job as Anthony Kenny and Robert Stoothoff in
providing us with a philosophically accurate and stylistically elegant English ver-
sion of Descartes’s side of the correspondence.8 Moreover her translation of
the Elisabeth side of the correspondence clearly surpasses Blom’s stylistically. In
crucial places it is also philosophically more accurate and consistent. For exam-
ple, Descartes typically uses the verb connaıˆtre [to be acquainted with] to express
the way the understanding and imagination only obscurely grasp mind-body
union, while the senses distinctly grasp it. Perhaps Descartes is attempting to dis-
tinguish between the way his senses know things by acquaintance from the way
his understanding knows things by having applied the method of doubt; in the
latter case he typically uses the verb sc¸avoir . Shapiro chooses not to impose this
interpretation on the text and uniformly translates connaıˆtre and sc¸avoir as ‘to
know’. This may be wise since on occasion Descartes does use sc¸avoir to express
knowledge of mind-body union.9 Blom, on the other hand, translates connaıˆtre
sometimes as ‘to know’ and other times as ‘to recognize’, without explaining the
philosophical interpretation guiding his translation choices.
Philosophically, the most important difference between Blom’s transla-
tion and Shapiro’s is the way they translate a crucial line in Elisabeth’s letter of
July 1, 1643. This line is the linchpin of Shapiro’s thesis that Elisabeth is trying to
construct a materialist account of mind. Here is the original: ella pourra duire a
quelque autre function de l’ame, qui ne luy est moins essentielle. Blom’s trans-
lation is: “it [extension] will be able to belong to some other function of the
soul less essential to her.” Shapiro’s is: “it [extension] could be suited to some
other functionof the soulwhich is no less essential to it.” In termsof seventeenth-
century French grammar, I do not see what would justify Blom in thinking that
this is an example of a nonnegative use of ‘ne’. Possibly, Blom assumed that
Elisabeth wants to preserve a major facet of Descartes’s philosophy of mind,
namely, that intellectual thought alone is essential to mind. On this reading,
8. See reference in footnote 2 above.
9. Descartes says the primitive notion of mind-body union is the notion that “each
always experiences within himself without philosophizing, in knowing [a` sc¸avoir] that he
is a single person who has together a body and a thought, which are of such a nature that
this thought canmove the body and sense what happens to it” (69).
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Elisabeth holds that while intellectual thought is the principal attribute ofmind,
constituting mind’s essence, there may be other functions of the mind that are
“less essential to her,” such as the things the mind can do insofar as it is united
to body: have sensations or move its own body. So, while extension is not part
of the mind’s essence, it may be a property the mind needs in order to carry
out its nonessential functions. However, saying that sensation and voluntary
motion are “less essential” to the mind is philosophically awkward—surely they
are either essential to the mind or not. Shapiro’s translation seems more likely,
but it attributes to Elisabeth the sort of bold break from Descartes’s philosophy
of mind that Arnauld had considered: contra Descartes’s real distinction argu-
ment, it seems possible that extension is part of the mind’s essence since exten-
sion is not conceptually inconsistent with thought. While above I gave reason to
be cautious of taking this to be Elisabeth’s considered view, it is nevertheless a
philosophically interesting interpretation andone that gains some support from
Elisabeth’s remark here.
Shapiro has given us a philosophically careful and stylistically refined
translation, together with a historically rich introduction and annotations, a use-
ful bibliography, and a reading of Elisabeth as committed to a materialist the-
ory of mind. All of this makes her edition of the Elisabeth-Descartes letters—
which also includes Elisabeth’s correspondence with the Quakers Robert
Barclay and William Penn, as well as Edward Reynold’s dedication to Elisabeth
of his Treatise on the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man—important reading
for scholars with an interest inDescartes or seventeenth-centurywomen’s contri-
butions to philosophy, as well as for students of early modern philosophy more
generally.
Eileen O’Neill
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
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Songsuk SusanHahn. Contradiction inMotion: Hegel’s Organic Concept of Life and
Value. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007. xv + 220 pp.
There is perhaps no philosophical issue with which Hegel is more identified—
and over which he has been more vilified—than his notion of contradiction.
Hegel famously insists in his criticism of Kant’s antinomies that opposition
“exists in every actual thing,” but what this claimmeans is hardly a matter about
which Hegel’s readers (either sympathizers or detractors) have ever been in
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agreement. There are widely differing views in the scholarly literature about
whether Hegel should be understood, for example, to affirm or deny the law of
noncontradiction, andHegel’s ownmore notorious comments in this context—
his appeals to the importance of Heraclitus, for example—are often brought up
as a way of ending a thorny discussion rather than as a point of departure for fur-
ther philosophical investigation.
A new book on Hegel’s notion of contradiction in general is therefore
something that is most welcome, and Susan Hahn’s book is particularly wel-
come for the way in which it explores contradiction as a sort of root issue behind
Hegel’s concrete approaches to the diverse topics of nature, ethics, and aesthet-
ics. In exploring these issues, Hahn helpfully brings to light several important
concernsworthyofmorephilosophical attentionat themoment: theconnection
between Goethe’s organic approach to nature andHegel’s, the ties between the
organic unity underneath Kant’s Critique of Judgment andHegel’s aesthetics, and
the ethical importance of actively engaging contradiction in the form of value
conflicts.
Hahn’s general positionon contradiction seems to be thatHegel neither
denies nor affirms the law of noncontradiction but rather addresses in his sys-
tem two kinds of contradiction (one “formal” and presumably to be avoided and
one “organic” that is the source of potential philosophical richness). She argues
that the ultimate account to be given of Hegel’s stance must reflect the ways
in which the more organic form of contradiction is in evidence in his philoso-
phies ofnature, art, andethics. In this light, she stresses interestingly thatHegel’s
position—not unlike that of an ancient Pyrrhonist—might best be regarded by
not merely examining the official claims he makes about contradiction but also
considering the implicit philosophicaluse hemakes of it in practice (a point that
ratifies the stress Aristotle placed on practice in his initial formulation of the
law itself).
Inher turn toHegel’s actualpractice,Hahnoffers a suggestive accountof
the importance forHegel of Goethe’s organicism—an endeavor at once holistic
and empirical in its aspiration. These sections of the book, addressing Goethe’s
theory of plants and attention to what is “living” in nature, are genuine con-
tributions to the literature since Goethe’s influence on Hegel is (aside from
the important ongoing work of Eckart Fo¨rster and others) still unfortunately
relatively underexplored in contemporary English language work on German
idealism.
Hahn takes as her aim what she terms a “naturalized” reading of Hegel’s
philosophical enterprise, and it is the exposition of this claim that she might
be encouraged to develop further. While Hegel’s logic on her naturalized read-
ing would still appear to have systematic priority over the more concrete phi-
losophy of nature, she does nonetheless make a number of claims that suggest
the reverse order (Hegel “seeks to derive the principle of determinate negation
directly from nature,” as she puts it in chapter 3). A related difficulty that might
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be addressed in further work is what understanding of the relation of nature and
spirit should follow from the naturalistic and organic approach to Hegel that
Hahn is suggesting. Hegel does after all insist, in an apparently nonreductive
manner, on spirit’s key explanatory role in the system, particularly in such well-
known claims as the remark that stands at the beginning of his Philosophy of Spirit
that “Spirit is the truth of nature.”
A similar concern can be raised about her claims for the role of nature
and contradiction in the other two central issues her book takes up: Hegelian
aesthetics and ethics. Hahn’s account of the similarities between Kant’s Critique
of Judgment and Hegel’s treatment of natural beauty (das Naturscho¨ne) in his lec-
tures on Aesthetics offers an important corrective to some contemporary views of
the distance between Kantian and Hegelian aesthetic projects. Yet, while Hegel
clearly insists in the introduction of the Aesthetics that Kant’s third critique pro-
vided “the starting point for the true comprehension of the beauty of art,” he
nonetheless argues that it is “only by overcoming Kant’s deficiencies” that we
could arrive at the position of the “true” concept of beautiful art. (Hegel thus
goes on to say that Schiller’s notion of beauty as “freedom in appearance” and
Schelling’s concept of the philosophy of art are essential moments in the devel-
opment of his ownposition that run beyond amerely interpretive appropriation
of Kantian aesthetics—both moments that it might have been interesting to see
developed in connection withHahn’s argument.)
Thebook’s treatmentof ethics rightly takesup the importanceof the role
of value conflict as well as what she calls the “essentially retrospective” nature
of ethical action and judgment in Hegel’s ethics. The final chapter argues that,
despite his criticism of Romantic views of conscience, Hegel nonetheless needs
to employ a positive notion of conscience to capture the holistic goals of his
ethics on which intention and result, particular purpose and universal claim
are not merely isolated moments. Hahn’s account of Hegel’s holistic notion of
conscience and practical rationality reflects the vitally oppositional and often
tragic sense of agency that lies behind Hegel’s mature ethical and social phi-
losophy; her final chapter suggests, as has some other recent work, that there
are certain negative reactive attitudes toward contradiction, such as guilt and
regret, that must be seen to play a central role if something like Hegel’s story of
value revision is to work. Hahn’s book ends with an image that it is clear Hegel
brooded about from his earliest reading of Greek classics until his late lectures
on aesthetics: the image of the blind but deeply reflective Oedipus of the sec-
ond Sophoclean play, coming retrospectively to terms with the contradictions
that had emerged froman action that hehadnot intendedbut for whichhe took
some form of responsibility. Hahn appeals to this image to suggest ways in which
a contemporary reading of the late Oedipus might yoke together elements that
stem both from ancient (causal) as well as modern (Kantian, Fichtean) notions
of agency. Given the richness of that suggestion, it would be interesting to see
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Hahndevelop somewhat further how themorehistorically inflected and socially
mediated elements of Hegelian agency are to be related to the intuitive and
organic side of the account that her current book has stressed.
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